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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT OF 939 (FELA)
TO SAVE SOME REMEDIES FOR COMPENSATION
CLAIMANTS
VnNON X. MILLEO*
In recent years the story of FELA has been told often.1 It is not necessary to
repeat much of it here except by way of summary. For 19o6 and 19o8 the Federal
Employers' Liability Act was a remedial scheme.2 Understandably in those years
lawmen looked skeptically at social legislation. The dead hand of a pre-industrial
society was being pulled from the eighteenth century through the Fourteenth
Amendment to choke state welfare programs? Some lawyers in 19o8 were prepared
to argue that judge-made concepts like fellow-servant, contributory negligence, and
fault are comparable to dogmatic truths.' Nevertheless, when the chips were down,
even a tough constitutionalist like Van Devanter was not convinced.5 He remem-
bered Waite's epigram that there is no vested interest in a rule of law.6
It was a unanimous Court, speaking through Van Devanter, that approved the
second Federal Employers' Liability Act. The statute was a regulation of commerce
within the delegated powers of Congress, the Court said, and the scheme of it was
consistent with due process, although Congress had dared to touch contributory negli-
gence and fellow-servant and to regulate the employment relations between inter-
state railroads and their workmen. In the Second Act of 19o8 Congress respected
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for Railroad Employees, 2 LovoLt, L. Rev. 138 (X944). Contributor to legal periodicals.
' See the symposium in a recent volume of the Cornell Law Quarterly. Pollack, Workmen's Com-
pensation for Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 236 (i951); Richter and Forer,
Federal Employers' Liability Act-A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36 CoaNm.L L. Q.
203 (1951). See also Delisi, Federal Employers Liability Act--Scope and Recent Developments, 18 Miss.
L. J. 206 (X947); Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LoYoLt L. REv. 138 (1944).
The most important publication in the field is the Survey of the United States Railroad Retirement Board
published in 1947, WoRK INJURIEs IN TiE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 1938-1940, in two volumes [hereinafter
referred to as RRB StnvEY].
'The First Federal Employers' Liability Act was approved on June II, 19o6. 34 STAT. 232. The
Supreme Court decided that the first statute was unconstitutional. The criticism was special and it is
discussed below in the text. See The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (i9o8). The Second
Act was approved on April 22, 19o8. 35 STAT. 65. See 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq. (1946).
'It is a big order to cite cases for this proposition. You think of MIr. Justice Field and freedom
of contract and you think of lawyer Campbell after he retired from the bench and his arguments on
privileges and immunities and due process. Perhaps the one case that illustrates best the figure of speech
in this proposition is Lochner v. New York (198 U. 5. ) decided in 19o5.
'See the arguments of the railroads' counsel summarized in the report of the First Cases. 207
U. S. at 484-485. See the argument of John H. Hall for the railroads in the Second Cases, 223 U. S. at 4'.
'The Second Act was approved by the Supreme Court in 1912. Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U. S. 1 (19'12).
'See Van Devanter, J., in 223 U. S. at 5o; cf. Waite, C. J., in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 534
(z876).
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the Supreme Court's judgment;' the regulating of employment was restricted to
instances occurring in interstate commerce. But Congress did not dare to touch the
fault concept in the First Act of 19o6 or in the Second Act in 19o8, nor has Congress
dared to touch it up to now. Although there are many other chapters in this story,
that one is vital; work injury claims in the railroad business are adjusted like other
torts.
Many lawmen in x953 will describe any such program for settling work injuries
as obsolete. They think workmen's compensation is a better system, and they think
also that they have the experiences of forty years to corroborate their opinions. Now
these lawmen are told that compensation is a costly scheme, that administrative
expenses are high, that awards are inadequate, and that there is quantity litigation
developing from questioned claims.' Facts and figures are produced to show that
railroad men on the average and railroad employers on the average are better off
under the remedial tort scheme of the Federal Act than they would be under com-
pensation schemes in comparable areas. It is argued from the data in these com-
pilations that lawyers' costs are greater under compensation programs, that settle-
ments are easier under the Federal Act, and that the costs to carriers under it are
relatively moderate. But some lawmen are skeptical of figures. Even in simple
cases, they think the fault standard is an artificial one. They are not sure that fault
can ever be an adequate measure of a person's social responsibilities in the intricate
society of the mid-twentieth century. About FELA they know the story is a
special one, that percentagewise more plaintiffs will get judgments in these cases
than in the ordinary lawsuits for simple torts. But they know also that all plaintiffs
do not win even under this statute and that big verdicts and judgments are not
always good for everyone. Perhaps big judgments are not too large for plaintiffs'
needs and lawyers' work,9 but they can drain the resources of defendants who must
pay the judgments. There is a law of diminishing returns; the employment rela-
tion cannot be charged with all the social costs of work hurts.
Although the fault concept is vital in the story of FELA, it is not the only im-
portant chapter. How the Court in the early days limited the special statutory
scheme to cases affecting transportation or something so closely connected with
it as to be practically a part thereof is a chapter in the story that delights legalistic
lawmen.?° That tight transportation test was a common-law lawyer's kind of device
to stimulate appeals and spark litigation. It was pinpointed, as the New York
courts describe it, to the occasion of the injury.1 How the Court developed the
' See the decision on the First Act. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (19o8), dis-
cussed in the text.
8 See the pilot study prepared by authorization of the Graduate College, University of Illinois, under
the direction of Professors Alfred F. Conard and Robert I. Mehr: CosTs OF ADmsis'rraRINo REPARATION
FOR WORK INJURIES IN ILLINOIS (1952). See also Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Eficient
than Employer's Liability?, 38 A. B. A. J. iori (s952). Cf. Richter and Forer, Federal Employers'
Liability Act-A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Work~men, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 203 (1951).
'See Editorial, 5 NACCA L. J. II (195o); Note, 4 id. at 28o-31o (1949).
"°Shanks v. Delaware, Lack. & West. R. R., 239 U. S. 556 (x916).
"See Desmond, J., in Baird v. New York Central R. R., 299 N. Y. 213, 216, 86 N. E. 2d 567, 568
(1949).
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distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence so that one was
an absolute defense in spite of the statutory text and the other sufficient only to
affect the quantity of compensation is another chapter to intrigue the lawyer with
little taste for sociology.'2 How all of this was developed by the Court while
state compensation programs were expanding to absorb some of the left-overs, even
among railroad workmen,"3 is a chapter the legalists would like to overlook were
it not for New York Central Railroad v. Winfield34 The lawyers' Court that de-
veloped the transportation test and the fine distinction between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk declared in Winfield that they would protect the
regulatory scheme for railroad workmen against state compensation. The Act of
Congress was exclusive whenever a claim could be litigated under the Federal Act.
That was the Court's interpretation although Congress had not prescribed so by
specific text. Nevertheless, as the courts weeded out'" more cases from the Federal
Act through the transportation and pinpoint tests, a few more cases fell to work-
men's compensation until Congress plugged the leak in i939Y6
Did Congress try to reduce the compensation area in 1939? If you count noses
among judges the score is lopsided. 7 Because the federal scheme can be exclusive
if Congress wants to make it so, and because the Court said in the Winfield case
that Congress must have so intended, almost all of the men who have sat in judg-
ment have said that Congress tried to plug the leak. The Illinois Supreme Court
has held otherwise.' Some other judges have agreed with the Illinois court, notably
"See Toledo, St. L. & W. R. R. v. Allen, 276 U. S. 165 (1928); Delaware, Lack., & West. R. R. v.
Koske, 279 U. S. 7 (1929). In these cases the Supreme Court confirmed the case law of the lower
courts. In the Koske case Mr. Justice Butler said (p. ii): "Defendant was not bound to maintain its
yard in the best or safest condition; it had much freedom in the selection of methods -o drain its
yard and in the choice of facilities and places for the use of its employees. Courts will not prescribe
standards in respect of such matters or leave engineering questions such as are involved in the con-
struction and maintenance of railroad yards and the drainage system therein to the uncertain and varying
judgment of juries!"
1" See Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LOYOLA L. REV. 138, 152 (X944).
1 244 U. S. 147 (0917). There is another Winfield case published in the same volume. The plaintiffs
are not the same Winfields and the events in the two cases are not related. See Erie R. R. v. Winfield,
244 U. S. 170 (1917).
as In 191o Congress provided specially that state and federal courts should have concurrent juris-
diction in these cases. 36 STAT. 291, as amended in 1948, 62 STAT. 989. See 45 U. S. C. §56. In effect
the plaintiffs may choose the courts for trial. State legislatures have tried to reduce the trying of cases
affecting non-residents and out-of-state events in local courts. See Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner,
314 U. S. 44 (1941). This kind of legislation can be supported now if it is effective against all non-
residents including those who are domiciled in the local state. Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950).
10 See Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LOYOLA L. REv. 138, 152-153
(944); RRB SURVEy 8, 28.
"The list of cases in which compensation was denied is long. Kettner v. Industrial Comm., 258
Wis. 615, 46 N. W. 2d 833 (1951); Bowers v. Wabash R. R., 246 S. W. 2d 535 (Mo. App. 1952);
Baird v. New York Central R. R., 299 N. Y. 213, 86 N. E. 2d 567 (i949); Trucco v. Erie R. R., 353
Pa. 320, 45 A. ad 20 (1946), confirming the decision in Scarborough v. Pennsylvania R. R., 154 Pa.
Super. 129, 35 A. 2d 603 (i944); Albright v. Pennsylvania R. R., 193 Md. 421, 37 A. 2d 870 (1944);
Prader v. Pennsylvania R. R., I13 Ind. App. 518, 49 N. E. 2d 387 (i943); Southern Pac. Co. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Comm., 19 Cal. 2d 271, i2o P. 2d 88o (1942); Piggue v. Baldwin, 154 Kan. 708, 121
P. ad 183 (1942); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Potts, 178 Tenn. 425, 158 S. W. 2d 729 (1942).
18 Thomson v. Industrial Commission, 380 Ill. 386, 44 N. E. 2d i9 (1942), discussed in 2 LOYOLA
L. REV. 93 (X943).
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some of the judges in the appellate divisions in New York 9 and the judges of the
Supreme Court of Idaho,"° but the Court of Appeals in New York has added its
weight to the majority side,2' and the judges in Idaho depended much on case law
from the old regime.22 The judges of the Supreme Court in South Carolina will
be on the Illinois side when the right case comes along, because they have said al-
ready that Congress has not foreclosed the deciding of some railroad cases under a
state employers' liability act.23 Perhaps it is significant that the Supreme Court
has refused to commit itself, although it has supervised carefully the administering
of the statute as amended in every other area. Perhaps it is significant also that
Winfield was decided in 1917.
The year 1939 was a milestone in the story of the Federal Act. The statute was
amended,2 the rigid transportation test for interstate commerce was rejected, and
assumption of risk was classified with contributory negligence. Interstate commerce
was expanded to include more than transportation, and the scheme of the statute was
extended to cover work injuries happening to anyone, any part of whose duties are in
furtherance of such commerce. The old distinctions in the case-law results had
seemed artificial to many lawyers. 25 From the story of the litigation in the years be-
fore 1939, from the discussions in the houses of Congress, and from the text of the
statute as amended, one deduction seems obvious. Congress was trying to cure a bad
situation. Congress was trying to rescue the Court from legalisms that were sterile.
The transportation test was devised by the Court within a few years after the date of
the adverse decision on the first Federal Act.2e Under the commerce clause the Court
had said in that first case that Congress could regulate only those injuries that were
suffered by railroad men who were engaged in interstate commerce when they
were hurt.27 If that premise is true, the pinpoint test for transportation does have
meaning. However, during the years between 19o8 and 1939 the Court in other
"See Heffernan, J., dissenting in Wright v. New York Central R. R., 263 App. Div. 461, 462, 33
N. Y. S. 2d 531, 532 (3d Dep't 1942); Baird v. New York Central R. R., 274 App. Div. 577, 86 N. Y. S.
2d 54 (3 d Dep't 1948).
"0 Moser v. Union Pac. R. R., 65 Ida. 479, 147 P. 2d 336 (1944).
"' Baird v. New York Central R. R., 299 N. Y. 213, 86 N. E. 2d 567 (949), reversing Baird v.
New York Central R. R., 274 App. Div. 577, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 54 (3d Dep't 1948).
"The Idaho court was willing to sacrifice some of the new statutory program to save a little bit of
workmen's compensation. The injured man was working on a new construction project. Under the
transportation test of the older case law that was not interstate commerce. Cf. New York Central R. R.
v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (I9i7) (the first compensation case). It has been argued and decided that
this kind of work does pertain to the furtherance of commerce under the new definition. Agostino v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 50 F. Supp. 726 (E. D. N. Y. 1943); d. Note, 153 A. L. R. 357 (x944). The
Idaho workman did not have a case for tort. After suffering a severe pain in his back he had collapsed
on the job and he was injured as he fell. It was a typical compensation case under the old case law
which the court relied on here without considering how the decision might affect the case of another
workman injured on a job like this where he might have a cause of action for fault.
"'Boyleston v. Southern Ry., 2i S. C. 232, 44 S. E. 2d 537 (5947).
", Act of August 11, 1939, 53 STAT. 1404; 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq. (1946).
" See Heiarings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 17o8 (Amending
the FEL ), 76th Cong., sst Sess. (1939). The general counsel of the American Association of Railroads
agreed with the general counsel for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. See particularly, id. at 24.25.
"
0 Shanks v. Delaware, Lack. & West. R. R., 239 U. S. 556 (1916).
"The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (I9O8).
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cases touching other fields had gone far to agree with Congress that regulatory
powers over commerce are great enough to affect not only the carrying and selling
of goods in commerce but even the steps preliminary to the production of goods for
interstate commerce28 There is little if anything in the history of previous litiga-
tion, in the floor discussion, or in the text of the statute to support a deduction that
Congress was trying to close a gap and to shut off all other possible remedies, unless
it is found in the Winfield case and the silence of Congress.
The other big remedial change of 1939 affected assumption of risk. Distinguish-
ing between a plaintiff's assuming the risk of injury and contributing to his hurt
through his own misconduct often is a matter of literal explanation. The case law
in this area before 1939 was difficult to accept,29 and Congress abolished the dis-
tinction. Obviously Congress was not trying to close a gap with this proposal.
Many persons who would have been barred under the old defense have been suc-
cessful as plaintiffs because of this change in the statute,30 and the Court has
been careful to protect these plaintiffs against a new kind of playing with the old
defense. It is not a risk of railroading which a workman must accept, when a
condition exists that the company can reduce zl Proof of that condition is enough
to support a plaintiff's prima facie case of fault1 32
Most of what has happened since 1939 has been good. The old statute was in-
adequate and the case-law distinctions were artificial. The Act of 1939 was good
social legislation, and the courts have been generous in appraising the new stand-
ards.33 There has been some lawyer criticism of the newer case-law trends, as if
2 8 The Wagner Act: 49 STAT. 449 (938); Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 34 (937);
Santa Cruz Co. v. Labor Board, 303 U. S. 453 (1938). The Fair Labor Standards Act: 52 STAT. io6o
(1938); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. oo (1941); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 5,7
(1942). The decisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act were effected after 1939 but the statute
was enacted in 1938 and the favorable opinions of 1941 and 1942 were generated in the ease law of
1937 and 1938.
' See the eases cited in note 12, supra. See Snow v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 So. 200 (La. App. 1936).
The decedent's dependents were denied relief although some of the dead man's colleagues were
tortfeasors. The decedent knew he could not swim when he stepped onto an unstable raft in a pond
of water.
"°See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 (1948); Sadowski v. Long Island R. R., 292 N. Y. 448,
55 N. E. 2d 497 (944).
"
1 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 318 U. S. 54 (1943). The plaintiff in the Tiller ease had to
wait long to get justice in the end. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 323 U. S. 574 (1945).
Again the court of appeals was reversed, but this time a jury had found a verdict for the plaintiff and the
ease was remanded for judgment to be entered on the verdict.Cf. Fleming v. Kellett, 167 F. 2d 265 (ioth Cir. 1948).
s We are thinking here of eases like Tiller on assumption of risk and of those cases in both state and
federal courts where the judges have tried to reach with Congress for an expansive concept of interstate
commerce. When the injured workman can build on fault, this generous interpretation produces good
results. Cf. Edwards v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 131 F. 2d 366 (7th Cir. 1942); Erwin v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 36 F. Supp. 936 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Maxies v. Gulf, M. & 0. R. R., 358 Mo. 1190, 219 S. W.
2d 322, zo A. L. R. 2d 1273 (1949); Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Meeks, 30 Tenn. App. 520, 208
S. W. 2d 355 (1947); Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Fisher, 2o6 Ark. 705, 177 S. W. 2d 725 Cx944). Perhaps
all of the plaintiffs would have been denied relief in actions under the statute before 1939 because when
they were hurt they were not engaged in interstate commerce, as it was defined in the Shanks ease.
However before 1939, persons like these plaintiffs could have qualified as claimants for state compensa-
tion. Unless the old compensation benefits have been preserved, men like these would be without relief
today if they could not win on fault.
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the results indicate now that there is an absolute liability under this statute without
the standardizing of compensation that is attendant usually with an absolute liability
program 3 4  These critics protest too much. It is true, as we have seen, that the
courts have protected railroad workmen against a new kind of assumption-of-risk
defense. It is true also that there are decisions like Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union
Railroad5 and Bailey v. Central of Vermont Railway8 where the evidence was cir-
cumstantial or the omissions very slight3 Perhaps the catalogue of cases where
juries find on negligence against plaintiffs in these actions is not large, but there
are such cases, s and the list is long where courts have dismissed complaints or
directed verdicts for defendants when the evidence of negligence was not enough. 0
The Tennant case and the Bailey case point to possibilities for circumstantial evi-
dence that the Supreme Court in the I92O's might have appraised as insufficient4 0
The Court has become more jury conscious on contributory negligence; comparisons
of fault are for the jury only to adjudge 1 Nevertheless, FELA smacks of tort
liability. Findings must depend on facts even where the inferences suggest non-
feasances.4
2
'See Black, J., in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 6r-62 (1949).
a;321 U. S. 29 (1944).
319 U. S. 350 (1943).
Cf. the following cases from state courts: Hayes v. Wabash R. R., 36o Mo. 1223, 233 S. W. 2d 12
(1950); Williams v. New York Central R. R-, 402 Ill. 494, 84 N. E. 2d 399 (i949); Sadowski v.
Long Island R. R., 292 N. Y. 448, 55 N. E. 2d 497 (1944). See Biggs, J., in Jacobs v. Reading Co.,
130 F. 2d 612, 613 (3d Cir. 1942). Judge Biggs refers to the special standards for negligence in the
case law under the Federal Act.
sTracy v. Terminal Ass'n, 17o F. 2d 635 (8th Cir. 1948); Kraus v. Reading Co., 167 F. 2d 313
(3 d Cir. 1948); Roberts v. United Fisheries Co., 141 F. 2d 288 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 753 (1944). The last case was tried under the Jones Act but the standards for negligence under
that statute are comparable with those under FELA.
"D Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Craven, x85 F. 2d 176 (4 th Cir. 1950) (brakeman encumbered with
lantern and lunchbox injured when he tried to crawl over a gondola car in a moving train); Mastrandrca
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 132 F. 2d 318 (3d Cir. 1942) (crossing watchman killed when trying to prevent
children's crossing intersection); Southern Ry. v. Mays, x92 Va. 68, 63 S. E. 2d 720 (1951) (section hand
on special duty as watchman killed while crossing in front of train); Camp v. Southern Ry. 232 N. C.
487, 6r S. E. 2d 358 (i95o) (section foreman injured as he slipped and fell while trying to climb into
a freight car through an open door); Cowdrick v. Pennsylvania R. R., 132 N. J. L. 131, 39 A. 2d 98
(1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 799 (1945) (bridge tender fell from shanty with no eyewitnesses);
Cunningham v. Great Northern Ry., 73 N. Dak. 315, 14 N. W. ad 753 (1944) (telegraph lineman
struck down in a speeder on main track by passenger train when there was no evidence that train was
not on schedule); Osment v. Pitcairn, 349 Mo. 137, 159 S. W. 2d 666 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S.
587 (1942), 320 U. S. 792 (1943) (switching crewman disabled by fellow employee in horseplay when
there was no evidence to suggest that fellow servants conduct could have been expected). This is just
part of the list but these are sufficient to indicate that the absolute liability criticism is an over-statement.
"Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U. S. 472 (1926). Nevertheless even today there
must be something in the circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a finding that relates the injury
to fault. Cf. Cowdrick v. Pennsylvania R. R., 132 N. J. L. X3,1, 39 A. 2d 98 (1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 799 (1945).
"' Wilkerson v. McCarthy is the classic case of recent years. 335 U. S. 53 (1949). See also Uric
v. Thompson, 337 U. S. x96 (i949); Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Scharb, 1x F, 2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1945). But see Southern Ry. v. Mays [x92 Va. 68, 63 S. E. 2d 720 (595x)] where the state
court offered as one reason for reversing the judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff that the accident
was caused by the plaintiff's foolhardiness.
4'In the Tennant case there was evidence that the trainman had not rung a warning bell. Cf.
Malone v. Gardner, 242 S. W. 2d 516 (Mo. i95i) (where decedent fell from switch engine when no
one was looking and where it was evident that the engine could have been equipped to reduce danger
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Although the courts have been generous in appraising the new statute and
applying its standards to produce more judgments for successful plaintiffs, they have
stubbed their toes in one small area. It is understandable but unfortunate that in
the area of workmen's compensation judges have let the Winfield case spoil the
remedial effects of the 1939 amendments. The Winfield case must be studied in its
setting. Several important compensation cases were decided by the Supreme Court
during the 1916 Term, and Winfield was a compensation case. The first cases
on the constitutionality of workmen's compensation, Southern Pacific Company v.
Jensen,43 and the Winfield case were decided in that term. The compulsory
compensation statute of New York, the Court said, was constitutional,4 4 the vol-
untary pressure program of Iowa was good,45 and so was the compulsory class in-
surance compensation scheme of Washington.46 But the Court said in the Jensen
case that a state compensation program could not be devised for longshoremen, and
in Winfield that a state program could not be extended to cover railroad workmen
who were engaged in interstate commerce when they were hurt. Because there was
no case for fault, the workman in Winfield was without a remedy although he lost
the sight of an eye while he was on the job. Most of the sting has been removed
from Jensen. There is a federal compensation act now for longshoremen and harbor
workers,47 and the difficulties in allocating the right man to the right program,
federal or state, where there is the possibility of doubt, have been resolved by the
Court in Davis v. Department of Labor s The decision of any agency, federal or
state, on classification in the overlapping area, the Court said, will be taken as con-
clusive. But Winfield looms larger now than before 1939. Perhaps it is worth re-
membering that the New York Court of Appeals was reversed in Winfield and that
a powerful dissent was written by Mr. Justice Brandeis.
It is worth repeating that the effects of Winfield were not all bad before I939.4'
The Court had decided that the regulating of railroad workmen under the Federal
Act was exclusive in its area. Congress had no reason to prescribe so expressly in
19o8 because state compensation laws were not then on the statute books. With its
decision in the Winfield case and its tight transportation test, the Court was build-
ing a relatively restricted area within which the Federal Act could be exclusive.
Percentagewise the effect was not great, but in specific instances the results were
important. If a railroad workman was not covered under the Federal Act because
to persons who had to stand across the boiler top); Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 31 Cal. 2d
117, 187 P. 2d 729 (1947), rev'd, 333 U. S. 821 (1947) (company obliged to search for a conductor
reported missing).
43 244 U. S. 205 (1917).
" New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
4 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 (1917).
" Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (917) (four judges dissenting without
opinions after counsel had attacked the state-administered insurance scheme).
' Enacted in 1927. 44 STAT. 1424. See 33 U. S. C. §9oi et seq. (946).
48 314 U. S. 244 (0941).
41 See Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LOYOLA L. Rav. 138, 152 (1944).
Compare the discussion in footnote 22 supra.
248 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
of the transportation test and the pinpoint rule, he could be covered under a state
program. In some instances the legislatures had set up state liability programs
for railroad workers, and under some local compensation statutes railroad employees
were excluded expressly from the compensation scheme." Nevertheless in a
substantial number of states some injured railroad workmen could get compensa-
tion benefits. 51 With instances of cases like Chicago & Northwestern Railway v.
Bolle'2 added to the picture, some cases were falling to the compensation programs.
It is the principal thesis of this paper that there is no reason to conclude that
Congress tried to affect the compensation area in x939 or to extend the doctrine
of the Winfield case. The scope of the statute now is so comprehensive that there
are few railroad employees who are not covered by it.5 ' If any employee does
anything as a part of his daily routine pertaining to interstate commerce under the
expanded definition, he can process his case under the federal statute no matter what
he was doing when he was hurt. Of course his injury must have been derived
from something incidental to his job. 4 The word "can" is the nub of the proposi-
tion. If he "can" process his case, does it follow necessarily that he "must" do it?
That is what the great majority of judges have said, and they charge their con-
clusions to the theme of the Winfield case.5 We do not propose here to examine
all the criticisms against FELA and workmen's compensation, or to consider the
kinds of remedial programs that have been offered as substitutes for the federal
scheme.5" We are supposing for our problem that we must work with case law
o See the tabulation in the Railroad Retirement Board Survey on page 28.
You think of the states where you have lived. In Minnesota there was a state employers' liability
act, with its remedial tort scheme for railroad workers comparable to the program of the Federal Act.
See Minn. Laws 1915, c. 187, as amended, Minn. Laws x923, c. 133, Minn. Laws x951 c. 51;
ci. MINN. STAT. 1949 §§219.77-219.83. In Louisiana railroaders could be covered under state compensa-
tion. See Fluitt v. New Orleans T. M. Ry., 187 La. 87, 74 So. x63 (1937). It was so in Wisconsin
[cf. Ketmer v. Industrial Comm. 258 Wis. 615, 46 N. W. 2d 833 (ig5I)] and in California [c. Mc-
Kinney v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 137 Cal. App. 206, 30 P. 2d 78 (934)].
S2284 U. S. 74 (1931). The plaintiff lost a case where the record was sufficient for fault. When
he was hurt he was not engaged in transportation or something so closely related to it as to be within
the definition of the Shanks case. Under the Illinois case law he could have processed a claim for
compensation. By the time that final judgment was entered against him in the tort case, it could
have been too late for him to ask for compensation. The Supreme Court has been generous about
the tolling of the statutory limitations in the Federal Act when a plaintiff has asked first for compensa-
tion. See McCabe v. Boston Terminal Co., 309 U. S. 624 (940), reversing, 303 Mass. 450, 22 N. E. 2d
33 ('939).
" Some of the judges who have wanted to save some of the old area of compensation have been will-
ing to sacrifice part of the remedial scheme of 1939. Cf. Baird v. New York Cent. R. R., 274 App. Div.
577, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 54 (3d Dep't 1948), reVtd, 299 N. Y. 213, 86 N. E. 2d 567 (1949). There the court
tried to save a compensation claim by effecting a tight interpretation of the newer definition of interstate
commerce. It has been obvious to most judges that Congress intended the 'definition to be administered
generously. The Idaho court tried to save a compensation case by agreeing with the older cases that
work on a new construction job was not in furtherance of interstate commerce. Moser v. Union Pac.
R" R., 65 Ida. 479, 147 P. 2d 336 (r944) discussed in note 20, supra. If the courts can save some of
the compensation benefits from the old regime, they must do it with some other kind of interpretation
scheme.
"This is hornbook law that is basic under any kind of work-injury program. Cf. Erie R. R. v.
Winfield, 244 U. S. 170 (,1917).
See the cases cited ia note 17, supra.
See the Resolution enacted in the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at St.
Louis in 1949. 74 A. B. A. RP. xo8 (1949). Cf. RRB Suavay cc. zo, iz, x2; Pollack, Workmen's
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and with old-fashioned lawyer techniques on statutory interpretation, distinctions,
and analyses. It is a small percentage kind of job at best, and it is not an adequate
substitute for a comprehensive reappraisal, but it is important as a preliminary in-
quiry. Although the case quantity seems minute, the problem has been important
to individuals in many instances. Some lawmen are not ready yet to resolve even
small inequities by the law of averages.
Certainly we must reckon with the Winfield case and the power which Congress
has to do exactly what the Court discovered in 1917. But we are working in the
area of statutory construction, and in that area we do not follow precedent blindly
or forever. 7  It is true that there have been many opportunities for Congress to
attack the theme of Winfield either to clinch it, to disavow it, or to afford to state
agencies some choice about it. By precise text Congress has not effected any change.
Nevertheless, the whole scheme of the 1939 revision is remedial in plan. If we are
so impressed by time and silence in our approach to the Winfield case as to con-
clude that it is one which the Court cannot now disregard, it is arguable that the
Court can tie Winfield to the case law of the old era. The few instances that may
slip through to workmen's compensation will not be many, nor will the totality of
compensation awards be much in dollars and cents, but an award in compensation
can mean much to a claimant like the workman in Southern Pacific Company v.
Industrial Accident Commission," a California case. The claimant was a car re-
pairman who was trying to remove an iron hinge from the door of a work
car, when he was hurt. In pulling and tugging at the hinge he disengaged a sliver
of metal which struck him in the eye, and he lost the sight of the eye. To attempt
to solve this kind of case with fault, safe-place, and inadequate-tool doctrines smacks
of ritual and incantation. It is enough to say that the man in the California case
was without a remedy because the court was Winfield conscious, although a work-
man like the injured claimant would have been entitled to compensation in Cali-
fornia before 19 39 .  There are other cases like it, enough of them that lawyers
Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 236, 271 (1951); Richter and
Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act--A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36 CORNELL L.
Q. 203, 205 (1951); Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LOYOLA L. REV. 138,
i6x-x62 (1944).
Even in the highest English Court, the Lords recognize that they are not bound by precedent on
statutory interpretation. Cf. Harris v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, [1939] A. C. 7x.
"8 Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 19 Cal. 2d 271, 12o P. 2d 88o (1942).
"
9 See McKinney v. Industrial Acc. Comm., r37 Cal. App. 2o6, 30 P. 2d 78 (1934). But cf. North-
western Pac. R. R. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 73 Cal. App. 2d 307, r66 P. 2d 334 (g46). In the latter
case deceased was a brakeman assigned to service on interstate trains. He was killed in a collision with
another automobile while he was riding to work in a taxicab furnished by his employer. The accident
occurred before 1939. The cab was used because other means of public transportation were not
available and the occasion pertained to his employment. But the pinpoint rule did not control the case.
When a railroad man is engaged in both kinds of work and is killed when he approaches the yards or
the office, the interstate possibilities are dominant. That proposition was derived from the other Winfield
case. Erie R. R. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 173 (1917). The Winfields in the two cases were not
related to each other. Their employers were different and there was no connection between the events
in the two cases. The proposition of the other Winfield case when applied to the facts in the California
case left the plaintiff without a remedy. No tort could be charged to the carrier, and no compensa-
tion could be awarded under the old case law.
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should be ready to reappraise Winfield and to think of statutory interpretation as a
part of a remedial program.6"
The Illinois Supreme Court is the only one committed squarely to the proposi-
tion that Congress in 1939 did not try to block the states' affording compensation
to railroad workmen engaged in local work.6' Obviously "local," "intrastate," or
"interstate" within the definition of a statute are not simple descriptive words.
They do suggest litigation, and they suggest the necessity for inquiries and ap-
praisals. According to Winfield when a case fits the pinpoint transportation test
of the old case law, there is no choice; the plaintiff sues in tort under the federal
statute, or he has no claim for anything. And we cannot argue that Congress has
disavowed that proposition. There were work injury cases before 1939 when railroad
men were remediless at law. In some states, as we have seen, the legislatures had
concluded that overlapping was so probable and so difficult to adjust that railroad
men should be excluded from the compensation field."2 We concede that we are
talking about few instances and small percentages. We argue that workmen's com-
pensation is good, even as it is today, and we point to the Illinois case as supporting
our thesis that Congress did not intend to touch in 1939 what bad been gained, per-
haps inadvertendy, through workmen's compensation.
Under the scheme of the Federal Act the workman in the Illinois case could
have qualified as a plaintiff in a suit for damages. He was a freight-yard watchman
who was attacked by thugs when he was trying to arrest a trespasser. Some of the
jobs that workmen like him do pertain to the furthering of interstate commerce.
But he was not engaged in interstate commerce at the time that he was hurt, even
under the extended definition of the Act. Under such circumstances the Illinois
court said that Congress cannot make the federal scheme effective to control a
claimant's case. It was a case of local interest, the court said, which can be regu-
lated only through state action. The thesis of the opinion is too sweeping. It is not
arguable now that Congress cannot control this kind of case exclusively, but it is
arguable that Congress has not chosen to do it, and that concurrent regulation is a
possibility for legislators and administrators to consider. In other instances like it,
plaintiffs have recovered damages under the Federal Act when they have argued
from a record that a company had failed to afford adequate police protection for
an employee's safety.63 The Supreme Court has not held that in this narrow area
there cannot be concurrent regulation. The Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court.6" It is true that petitions for writs have
been denied in the other cases, also, where local courts have felt helpless before
"0 All of the cases cited in note 17, supra, are instances where workmen had suffered injuries arising
out of and happening during their employment and where compensation was refused for reasons like
those offered in the California case.
"' Thomson v. Industrial Comm., 380 Ill. 386, 44 N. E. 2d x9 (1942).
- RRB SuRvEY 28. See the discussion in note 51, supra.
" Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459 (947) (deciding, on demurrer, that plaintiff had stated a cause
of action); Lillie v. Thompson, x73 F. 2d 481 (6th Cir. 1949) (remanded to trial judge to enter judg-
ment on the plaintiff's verdict).
04 Thon~on v. Industrial Commission, 318 U. S. 755 (1943).
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE AcT OF 1939 (FELA) 251
the arguments of carriers derived from the expanded Federal Act and the thesis of
the Winfield case.65 It can be argued that this denying of writs indicates that
local judges do have some choice about the effect of Winfield after 1939.
If we must accept Winfield as spelling out some area of limitation on state
action, and if we argue from the scheme of the 1939 revision that Winfield must
be tied to the occasions that produced it, two alternatives are probable. There
can be state as well as federal regulation in all the area of railroading outside the
instances of transportation, or there can be state as well as federal regulation only
when the instances occur outside the area defined as interstate within the newer
statutory definitions. Under either approach we are inviting litigation over dis-
tinctions that can be artificial. Unless we accept the first alternative, however, we
are letting Winfield and the statutory changes affect the old area of compensation.
There is merit certainly in Mr. Justice Brandeis' criticism of the Winfield de-
cision. 6 Even in 1917 he would have let any injured railroader choose to litigate
his case for fault or to file a claim for compensation. But there is an argument
against the Brandeis thesis. Employers must be protected against crippling costs.
Standardized compensation and extended liability are two ends of one remedial
stick.6 7 There is another argument against the Brandeis thesis, one that is perhaps
more legalistic. Time and silence are on the side of Winfield as a potent limitation.
If Winfield is pinned down to the case law of the old era, there will be overlapping
of statutory regulations, and there will be an area where absolute liability will
not be conditioned by limitations on the amounts recoverable, but the area will
be minute, the cases few, and the costs trivial. The one good result from the old
era can be preserved, and some few claimants can be protected. That the costs of
litigation over hair-splitting distinctions can outweigh the advantages in preserving
something good from the old regime is a probability that can be resolved only
through the attitudes and understanding of the judges. That judges can respond
to resolve probabilities like these is illustrated in the story of the Jensen case.
The Winfield case is published in the same volume of reports as the opinion in
the Jensen case.6 In that case the Court held that longshoremen were beyond the
reach of state legislatures with compensation programs. In other cases following
Jensen harbor workers were added to the protected class.6 9 Congress did step in
thereafter to afford a comprehensive compensation program for both longshoremen
and harbor workers."0 Perhaps it is easy to describe a longshoreman but it is not
easy to describe the kind of harbor worker that a state legislature cannot touch.71
" Trucco v. Erie R. R., 328 U. S. 843 (1946); Albright v. Pennsylvania Co., 323 U. S. 735 (1944).
e 44 U. S. 154 et seq.
" See Pitney, J., in New York Cent. R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. x88, 202-204 (1917).
" Winfield: 244 U. S. 147; lensen: 244 U. S. 205. In fact, the decisions were handed down on
the same day.
"0 The word "protected" includes a touch of sarcasm. See Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S.
222 (930); Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Docks & Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171 (1924).
" The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Actr 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C.
§9o et. seq. (1946).
"' See Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244 (1941). In spite of the cases referred to in note
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In some instances the person who can qualify as one is engaged by an employer
who contributes to a state fund or carries insurance protection under a state pro-
gram and who discovers only at the time of the event that his workman was en-
gaged in navigation. Supposedly the problem must be solved by one answer. At
the time of his injury the man was a harbor worker and subject only to the federal
compensation scheme, or he was some other kind of worker whose claim must be
processed under a state act. The distinctions are fine, and the decisions are ad-
ministrative. In the Davis case the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility
of concurrent control in these situations by allowing the agency, federal or state,
under which a claim is first processed, to effect a final classification which will
not be reviewed.72 The Court has admitted that the effect of this decision is to
afford a kind of double regulation.
There are some other cases which support the thesis of this paper. The South
Carolina Supreme Court has been just as positive as the Illinois court in stating its
case against exclusive regulation.73 The judgment in the South Carolina case was
trivial in amount, but the language of the court was definite in tone. The plaintiff
was a railroad workman who had strained his back while he was piling bales of cot-
ton on a railroad platform. The cotton was a part of an intrastate shipment, but this
workman did handle interstate shipments also. Under the State Employers' Li-
ability Act in this kind of case, the defense of contributory negligence was not
effective even to cut down compensation. Although the plaintiff had taclled the
job by himself when he should have known that he was not equal to the task, the
carrier should have known that other workmen would be needed. The plaintiff
sued under the state act, and judgment in his favor was affirmed in the state supreme
court. The court conceded that federal regulation could be effective here, but the
court said it was not exclusive. "No one questions that Congress has the power
to regulate interstate commerce, and it may preempt the field, but as before indi-
cated, we do not regard the 1939 amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability Act
as excluding all state law on the subject." 4
There are some instances where a railroad workman's case affects another car-
rier than the one who pays his wages. The Federal Act covers employment rela-
tions between carriers and their employees. The courts have said that "employer"
means conventional employer.75 Sometimes two carriers can qualify as conventional
69 supra, there was a trend in the case law toward recognizing a doctrine of local concern. The effect
of this was to permit many kinds of harbor workers to be covered under state compensation laws, See
Miller's Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59 (1926); Carlin Construction Company v. Heaney, 299 U. S.
41 (1936). As soon as Congress required compensation protection for harbor workers who were
not covered under state acts, courts began to effect an expansive interpretation in the other direction.
That trend is pointed up in the Parker case.
2 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249 (942); cf. Occidental Ind. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm., 24 Cal. 2d 310, 149 P. 2d 841 (1949) (where the state court reversed an award of the local
commission in favor of a local claimant who was not a harbor worker but a seaman fisherman entitled
to maintenance and cure).
" Boyleston v. Southern Ry., 21i S. C. 232, 44 S. E. 2d 437 (1947).
74211 S. C. at 242, 44 S. E. 2d at 541.
7
"Latsko v. National Carloading Corp., i92 F. 2d 905 (6th Cir. 1951); Gauldin v. Southern Pac.
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employers because they share wage-paying and time-using,7" but there are other
instances where the conventional employer status is derived from the measure of a
local statute. In a Missouri case the injured workman was employed by the
Terminal Association in St. Louis which had leased certain of its facilities for use
by the Frisco Lines. 7  The tortfeasors were employed by Frisco, and the injured
plaintiff was hurt in the line of duty. The case was processed against both carriers
under the federal statute. Although the plaintiff could not reach Frisco for the
claim because that carrier was not the conventional one, he did reduce his claim to
judgment for the tort against the Terminal Association. The court found the meas-
ure of the conventional employer's responsibility in a local statute under which a
lessor railroad must respond for a lessee's torts. In an Illinois case where an engineer
was employed by Gulf, Mobile & Ohio and was injured by the tort of the Terminal's
men, judgments were recovered by the engineer against both carriers. 78 The
Illinois court justified the double obligation by referring to a local statute like the
Missouri one.
As recently as 1949 the New York Court of Appeals agreed with the many
judges and said that Congress did reduce the compensation possibilities in 1939."
Nevertheless in 1952 that court protected a state compensation claim against a rail-
road carrier's attack and did it under an old state statute that was enacted before
1939.F0 The employer had paid compensation to the workman during a four-year
period. After the employee died, his widow claimed compensation for the final
two weeks. The carrier resisted the widow's claim and argued that the case was
one which was covered exclusively under the Federal Act and that the award
should never have been made in the first place. The court did not permit an
inquiry into the merit of the argument. Under the state law an employer can
waive its federal rights. It is significant that there had been no argument on this
proposition before the state board and that the court saw no repugnance between
the effect of this statute and the exclusiveness of the federal program.8l
Co., 78 F. Supp. 651 (N. D. Calif. 1948). Cf. Terminal R. R. Assoc. v. Fitzjohn, i65 F. 2d 473 (8th
Cir. 1948), 1 A. L. R. 2d 290 (1948): The injured crewman was not on the carrier's payroll Al-
though he worked in an industrial plant, he was in the company's employ. Originally he was procured
through the company's personnel office and he retained his seniority on the carrier's employment roll.
As an employer the railroad was responsible for the unsafe conditions in the plant.
"0 Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645 (1946).
" Graham v. Thompson, 212 S. W. 2d 770 (Mo. 1948).
s Wilson v. Terminal R. R. Association, 333 Ill. App. 256, 77 N. E. 2d 429 (948).
" Baird v. New York Cent. R. R., 299 N. Y. 213, 86 N. E. 2d 567 (1949).
" Ahern v. South Buffalo Ry., 303 N. Y. 545, 104 N. E. 2d 898 (1952); cf. Heagney v. Brooklyn
Eastern Dist. Terminal, x9o F. 2d 976 (2d Cir. x95z). The claimant in the latter case was barred
from suing under the Federal Act because he had processed his claim for compensation and had accepted
a weekly stipend. The federal court found a waiver here comparable to a settlement of the claim.
Thut see Pritt v. West Virginia Northern R. R., 132 W. Va. 184, 51 S. E. 2d IO5 (1948), cert. denied,
336 U. S. 961 (1949). In the West Virginia case compensation had been awarded but the action of
the local administrators had not been confirmed by judicial action. In 'West Virginia there was no
statute like the New York one, and the plaintiff was not barred.
" There may be other isolated instances where state law measures have been used in the exclusive
regulation area. One possibility is illustrated in Mooney v. Terminal R. R. Association of St. Louis
[352 Mo. 245, 176 S. W. 2d 6o5 (1944)]. It was argued in the Mooney case that discoverable peril
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The weight of the case law against the thesis of this paper is heavier in 1953 than
it was ten years ago, but the thesis is not old enough yet to be obsolete. It can be
summarized again in a few sentences. With the tight transportation test, the pin-
point rule, and the exclusive regulation doctrine of the Winfield case, the Supreme
Court opened a small compensation area to the employees of interstate railroads.
Congress did not restrict that area literally in the act of 1939. Although there was
merit in Mr. Justice Brandeis' argument against the Court's exclusive regulation
doctrine, the case in favor of the doctrine has depended on cost factors. If railroads
have to carry two kinds of work injury programs for most of their employees, the
costs of both could be unreasonable. Nevertheless, in 1939 Congress did not literally
confirm, or restrict, or modify the doctrine of the Winfield case. Nor did Congress
consider the probability of concurrent programs in any area, but Congress did plan
a series of changes to extend the remedial protection of the Federal Act to more
railroad personnel. Statutory interpretation demands adjustments which depend
on many factors. Because Congress did not meet the issue squarely, and because
the plan of the 1939 statute is expansive, it is arguable that exclusive regulation can
be confined to the area carved out before 1939. Under this interpretation there will
be concurrent regulation in a small area affecting a few railroad workmen. Within
that area a railroad company will have to carry the costs of two kinds of work
injury programs, but the cost burdens will be negligible. It is apparent that there
is in this the probability of litigation, depending on inquiries and classifications,
but there was that probability before 1939, and there has been some of it under
the one-sided case law since 1939. That the probability can be reduced, if the courts
choose to do it, is illustrated in the Davis case.
The argument of this paper is important for what it is, a proposal for solving
a few hard cases, but it serves a function that is even more vital. That the ques-
tionable area exists at all illustrates the inadequacies of the Federal Act as a scheme
of social legislation. Ours is not an ideal world. We do not try to measure the
good of a socal welfare program only by the ideals of a Christian kind of charity.
As we plan for social living in this world, we cannot always escape from history or
self-interest. Nevertheless we can try to reach for the common good and to under-
stand what it means for men to share social costs and benefits.
Although there are lawmen nowadays who tell us otherwise, two propositions
are fundamental. The fault concept in personal injury cases is obsolete, and there
is no such actuality as an adequate award. 2 Men cannot help themselves alone.
They share privileges, responsibilities, and functions in an industrial society, and
they share also its risks and burdens. Most of the burdens from physical hurts are
absorbed by injured persons and their families. Tort costs are shared with tort-
and last clear chance are different doctrines, that one is state and the other federal, and that the judge
had permitted the jury to use the state measure in the Federal-Act case. That part of the trial judge's
disposition was approved although a judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on other grounds. The
problem was relatively academic because under the federal statute contributory negligence can affect
only the amount of damages and the jury must effect the adjustment.
" Good lawyers have done much to popularize the phrase "adequate award." See Belli, The
AIdequate Alward, 39 CALIF. L. Rav. 1 (1951).
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feasors, employers, and insurers. Even when judgments are large some cost burdens
must be absorbed by community neighbors.8 3 Perhaps this kind of burden sharing
cannot be translated into cost items in a casualty or compensation statistical report,
but it does exist. Whether we like it or not, we have to live with social burdens
derived from torts, even though we suppose naively that only the parties to a lawsuit
are affected by the outcome, and then only as they have contributed to the events.
Reaching for alternatives to fault in the casualty field is a task lawmen must
measure up to someday. The impossibilities, the second guessing, and the cruelties
of the fault thesis are tempered practically by doctrines like respondeat superior and
res ipsa loquitur, and by conditions like insurance risk-shifting and adminstrative
measuring through the jury system. Perhaps we shall continue for many years to
get along with the fictions and incongruities in this field, because alternatives are
so difficult to plan and because the conditioning factors produce results that are
more or less acceptable. There is, however, a practicable alternative in the work-
injury field. 4 Figures and statistics notwithstanding, the case for workmen's com-
pensation is sound. The figures and compilations suggest that compensation as we
know it today may be inadequate and administration too costly. Perhaps we can
learn through these statistics that litigation-type contests have no place in the
administering of workmen's compensation and that common-law analogies are not
helpful for compensation lawyers, but social insurance is with us for good, and
lawyers must make the best of it.
We are still supposing that legislators function in the twentieth century as they
did in the early eighteen hundreds, when men from many levels of life attended
legislative sessions to prescribe for all of the affairs of state. Practically we know
that legislators confirm often what special interest groups propose as good. Nor is
that necessarily bad. Dentists, for example-and to present a wholesome illustration
-should know what the standards ought to be for men in their profession. Lobby-
ing by dentists for professional regulation is a sound routine8 5 Perhaps there is
reason to suppose that sometime law-making schemes like code drafting under
the old National Recovery Act may be an everyday device. Nevertheless it is
sufficient here to say that we are not ready yet for industry-council kind of law-
making and that Congress does not have to abdicate its functions when it accepts
from railroad men the suggestions for a plan of compensation. The framework of
the plan must come from people who are in the business-from workmen, clerks,
executives, stockholders, and railroad lawyers. Members of the legal profession are
important persons in their communities. Their advice is essential in the drafting
of social legislation, but they must serve as counselors and not as advocates.
" We: are not thinking here only of increased costs through bigger insurance premiums. The cost-
sharing possibilities are more indirect and more expensive.
" Some persons have seen possibilities for it in the automobile field. Compensation for Automobile
Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COL. L. RFv. 785 (932); Comment, 3 LAw & CONTEMTP. PROB. 579
(1936). Cf. Saskatchewan's Automobile Accident Insurance Act of 1947 (c. 15) as amended in 1948
(c. 15) and in 1949 (c. ii), discussed by J. Green in 31 J. Com tp. LEG. & INT'L L. ( 3d Set., Pts. III and
IV) 39 (1949).
"There is one such statute I know well and which I think is sound. Louisiana Acts 194o, No. 334.
LA. REv. STAT. §§37: 752-790 (1950).

